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as a whole. This decision was mandated by the special status of the
reservation and by the court's recognition that where a people have been
given the right of self-government they must be allowed to exercise that
right to the fullest extent possible, provided they do not infringe upon
compelling state interests. The Red Lake decision indicates that the
Minnesota court will continue to limit severely the state's interference
with the self-government of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians.
Juvenile Law-REFERRAL FOR PROSECUTION-In re Welfare of I. Q.S.,
_ Minn. -_,244 N.W.2d 30 (1976).
Minnesota, like most other states,' has a procedure for determining
whether a juvenile accused of a crime should be tried as an adult instead
of given special treatment because of age. These reference procedures
have been the subject of an "ever-increasing number of challenges."'
With In re Welfare of I. Q. S., 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated and reviewed nine appeals from orders of state juvenile courts
either referring or refusing to refer nine juveniles for prosecution as
adults.
Reference for prosecution is the waiver of jurisdiction by a juvenile
court over an alleged criminal offense.' Reference means that the juvenile may be tried as an adult in a municipal or district court on the
referred offense. In making the reference decision the court balances the
welfare and interests of the juvenile against the state interest in protecting members of society. 5 Reference for prosecution normally occurs when
1. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.4 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN.STAT. §
211.071 (Vernon 1962); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.533 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977).
2. In re Welfare of I.Q.S., Minn. -,
, 244 N.W.2d 30, 34 (1976).
3.
- Minn. -, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976).
4. Under many state statutes the process of removing a juvenile or an alleged violation
by a juvenile from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to a municipal or district court so
that the juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult is termed "waiver of jurisdiction," see,
e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 11-1553 (West 1966); Thx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.02
(Vernon 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978), or "transfer," see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501
(1976); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-34 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). In Minnesota it is
termed "reference for prosecution." See MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1976). As of 1974 all states
except New York and Vermont had some procedural mechanism for waiver or transfer.
See Note, Sending the Accused Juvenile to Adult Criminal Court:A Due ProcessAnalysis,
42 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 309, 309 n.3 (1975).
The procedure established by the Minnesota reference statute differs from that of most
other states. In Minnesota the case is referred to the prosecuting authority which then
decides whether to prosecute. If the prosecuting authority decides not to prosecute, the
juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the case and must proceed with it. See MINN. STAT.
§ 260.125(1) (1976), quoted in note 11 infra.
5. The balancing of interests required is described in the statement of the purpose of
the Minnesota Juvenile Act:
The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile courts is to secure for each minor
under the jurisdiction of the court the care and guidance, preferably in his own
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a juvenile is alleged to have committed a serious offense and is not
amenable to treatment in the juvenile court system.' A decision to refer
deprives a juvenile offender of all rights and benefits conferred by the
Juvenile Court Act 7 and subjects the juvenile to the potential imposition
of the same criminal penalties as would be imposed on an adult.' Thus,
as noted by the United States Supreme Court, "waiver of jurisdiction
is a 'critically important' action determining vitally important statutory
rights of the juvenile."I
The court in . Q. S. used the consolidation of the nine appeals as a
vehicle to decide three main issues: whether denial of a motion for
home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the
minor and the best interests of the state; to preserve and strengthen the minor's
family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents
only when his welfare or safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the minor is removed from his
own family, to secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents. The laws relating to juvenile courts shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes.
MINN. STAT.

§ 260.011(2) (1976).

6. Thus, only "hardcore" juvenile offenders are usually referred for prosecution as
adults. For a discussion of what constitutes a hardcore juvenile, see Note, Juvenile Law:
Decision to Refer Juvenile Offenders For Criminal Prosecutionsas Adults to Be Made on
Basis of "State of the Art" of Juvenile Corrections, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1098 n.5 (1976).
For a discussion of some of the special problems associated with hardcore juveniles, see
Boxmeyer, The Hard-Core Kid: If He Hollers Make Him Stay?, St. Paul Pioneer PressDispatch, May 6, 1978, § B, at 1B, col. 1.
7. MINN. STAT. ch. 260 (1976 & Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
602, §§ 3-12, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 334 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978,
ch. 637, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 374 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
657, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 397 (West), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750,
§§ 7, 9, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 822 (West), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch.
778, § 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 970 (West). The benefits of the Juvenile Court Act
are clearly outlined in the statement of the Act's purpose. See MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2)
(1976), quoted in note 5 supra. The Act's purpose reflects the parens patriae principle of
the juvenile court system. The term "parenspatriae" refers to the state's sovereign power
of guardianship over persons under disability and allows the state to act in place of a
juvenile's parent to secure the welfare of the juvenile. For a discussion of the development
of the parens patriaephilosophy that juveniles should be cared for rather than punished,
see Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 H.av. L. REv. 104 (1909). See also Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970).
8. An adjudication by a juvenile court is not considered a criminal conviction and the
subject juvenile is not considered a criminal. MINN. STAT. § 260.211(1) (1976). However,
if jurisdiction is waived the juvenile is treated as if he was never under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court. See id. § 260.125(3). Thus, the confidential nature of the juvenile court,
see id. § 260.155(1), is replaced by the publicity and notoriety associated with criminal
trials and, if convicted, the juvenile will acquire a criminal record.
9. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). Kent was the first major case
involving juveniles to be considered by the United States Supreme Court in this century.
Comment, Juveniles in the Criminal Courts: A Substantive View of the Fitness Decision,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 988, 989 n.8 (1976).
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referral is appealable by the state,"0 whether the reference statute" is
unconstitutional," and what findings-of-fact must be made by the juvenile court when making the reference decision." A fourth issue, the
availability of treatment facilities for hardcore juveniles, was mentioned
in the court's opinion" and discussed in detail in Justice MacLaughlin's
special concurring opinion. 5
On the appealability question, the court held that a refusal to refer
was appealable by the state. In so holding, the court reconsidered and
overruled its 1974 decision in the case of In re Welfare of A.L.J.16 that
the denial of the state's motion for referral was not a final order and was
thus not appealable. The court overruled its prior decision in light of the
recent United States Supreme Court decision in Breed v. Jones7 which,
based on a double-jeopardy argument, refused to allow the referral decision to be made after an adjudicatory hearing had been held by the
10. See Minn. at , 244 N.W.2d at 35.
11. The Minnesota reference statute, MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1976), provides as follows:
Subdivision 1. When a child is alleged to have violated a state or local law
or ordinance after becoming 14 years of age the juvenile court may enter an order
referring the alleged violation to the appropriate prosecuting authority for action
under laws in force governing the commission of and punishment for violations
of statutes or local laws or ordinances. The prosecuting authority to whom such
matter is referred shall within the time specified in such order of reference,
which time shall not exceed 90 days, file with the court making such order of
reference notice of intent to prosecute or not to prosecute. If such prosecuting
authority files notice of intent not to prosecute or fails to act within the time
specified, the court shall proceed as if no order of reference had been made. If
such prosecuting authority files with the court notice of intent to prosecute the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court in the matter is terminated.
Subd. 2. The juvenile court may order a reference only if
(a) A petition has been filed in accordance with the provisions of section
260.131
(b) Notice has been given in accordance with the provisions of sections
260.135 and 260.141
(c) A hearing has been held in accordance with the provisions of section
260.155, and
(d) The court finds that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the
public safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to juvenile
courts.
Subd. 3. When the juvenile court enters an order referring an alleged violation to a prosecuting authority, the prosecuting authority shall proceed with the
case as if the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never attached.
12. See Minn. at , 244 N.W.2d at 35-37.
13. See id. at
, 244 N.W.2d at 37-41.
14. See id. at -,
244 N.W.2d at 38-39.
15. See id. at -,
244 N.W.2d at 41-43.
16. 300 Minn. 542, 220 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (per curiam). In A.L.J. the court held that
an order refusing to refer a juvenile for prosecution as an alult did "not have the substantive effect of precluding [future] proceedings" and did "not unconditionally deny referral
for adult prosecution." See id. at 543, 220 N.W.2d at 304. Thus, the court reasoned, such
an order was not appealable by the state because it was not a final order. See id.
17. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
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juvenile court. 8 Hence, if the state were not allowed to appeal immediately a denial of reference, the state's right of appeal would be denied.
After resolving the appealability issue, the court discussed the contention that the Minnesota reference statute is unconstitutional because it
allegedly denies equal protection and due process. In response to this
contention the Minnesota Supreme Court held, based on "vast authority," that the Minnesota reference statute and procedure are constitutional and do not deny equal protection or due process." The court based
its decision partially on the fact that the Minnesota reference statute
compares favorably with section thirty-four of the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act." The court apparently felt that the Act itself is constitutional since it was drafted at least partially in response to the United
States Supreme Court decisions of Kent v. United States"' and In re
Gault," discussed below.n
The equal protection argument made was that the reference statute
may impose greater punishment upon certain juveniles than that which
other juveniles receive for the same offense. In response to this argument, the court noted that holding the reference statute unconstitutional for denying equal protection would mean that numerous pretrial
diversionary programs would have to be held unconstitutional.,' Pretrial
diversionary programs and reference of juveniles for prosecution as
18. See id. at 541. In the initial jurisdictional hearing the juvenile court found that the
juvenile had violated a criminal statute. At the subsequent waiver hearing the juvenile
court waived jurisdiction and referred the juvenile for prosecution as an adult. The United
States Supreme Court held that to try the juvenile again as an adult would violate the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. See id.
Based on Breed, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded in I. Q.S. that a decision not
to refer is a final order because a subsequent adjudication by the juvenile court will have
the effect of precluding future criminal proceedings by the state. See Minn. at
,
244 N.W.2d at 35.
19. Minn. at -,
244 N.W.2d at 36. For another recent Minnesota case discussing equal protection, see Unborn Child v. Evans, Minn. -,
245 N.W.2d 600 (1976),
noted in 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 233 (1978). In LQ.S. the Minnesota court also noted
that the Minnesota reference statute is not unconstitutional for imposing cruel and unMinn. at -,
244
usual punishment or for denying the right to a speedy trial. See N.W.2d at 40.
20. The Uniform Juvenile Court Act was promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968. The Uniform Juvenile Court Act has been
adopted substantially as written by North Dakota, see N.D. CEM. CODE ANN. ch. 27-20
(1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977), Pennsylvania, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 to -337
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978), and Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-201 to -282 (1977
& Supp. 1977). It also forms the basis for the Georgia Juvenile Act. See GA. CODE ANN.
tit. 24A (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
21. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
22. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Juvenile Court Act states that
the "Act has been drawn with a view to fully meeting the mandates of [the Kent and
Gault] decisions." UNWORM JUVENLE Coutrr AcT, Prefatory Note.
24. See

-

Minn. at

__,

244 N.W.2d at 37.
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adults are simply two examples of selectively enforcing criminal statutes. The exercise of reasonable selectivity in enforcing criminal statutes
was held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Oyler
v. Boles.25
The assertion that the reference statute and procedure denied due
process involved two arguments: (1) that the reference statute itself is
too vague and (2) that the statute is arbitrarily and capriciously applied.
The Minnesota Supreme Court answered the first argument by finding
that the statute incorporates suitable and ascertainable standards.2
The court correctly distinguished the Minnesota statute from the Michigan reference statute which was held unconstitutional for lack of
standards by the Michigan Supreme Court."
The Minnesota reference statute requires that one of two standards
be met before a juvenile court can order reference. The reference statute
is written in the alternative; the court must find that a juvenile is "not
suitable to treatment" or "the public safety is not served" by denying
reference.2" These two bases for reference, standing alone, are vague and
allow room for more judicial discretion than is necessary. The reference
statute itself and the remainder of the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act do
not define either of the standards or indicate what criteria should be
considered in determining when they are satisfied. The Minnesota Supreme Court did, however, in State v. Hogan,2 set out six criteria to be
considered in determining if the public safety is threatened:"
(1) The seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the offense; (3) whether the offense
was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (4) whether the offense was directed against persons or property;
(5) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act; and (6) the
absence of adequate protective and security facilities available to the
juvenile treatment system.
25. 368 U.S. 448, 454-56 (1962). Selective enforcement is constitutional only when it is
not based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race or religion. Id. at 456. The burden is
on the defendant to prove that there is impermissible discrimination, and the burden is a
heavy one. United States v. Smith, 354 A.2d 510, 512-13 (D.C. 1976).
26.

__

Minn. at

__,

244 N.W.2d at 36.

27. People v. Fields, 388 Mich. 66, 77, 199 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1972), aff'd on rehearing,
391 Mich. 206, 216 N.W.2d 51 (1974). The Michigan statute had provided that "the judge
...may, after investigation and examination . . . waive jurisdiction .... " MICH.
Comp. LAws ANN. § 712A.4 (1968). The standard was, in .the words of the Michigan
Supreme Court, "subject to so many possible interpretations as to be no standard at all."
388 Mich. at 76, 199 N.W.2d at 222. In contrast, the Minnesota reference statute requires
that the court consider the juvenile's suitability to treatment or the public safety in
making a reference decision. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d) (1976), quoted in note 11 supra.
28. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d) (1976), quoted in note 11 supra.
29. 297 Minn. 430, 212 N.W.2d 664 (1973).
30. Id. at 438, 212 N.W.2d at 669-70 (citing Mikulovaky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 196
N.W.2d 748 (1972) and Note, Reference for Prosecutionin Juvenile Court Proceedings,
54 MINN. L. REv. 389, 404 (1969)).
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Unfortunately the court has not set out similiar criteria to be considered
in determining when a juvenile is not suitable for treatment.
The Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules,31 which are applicable in all
Minnesota counties except Hennepin and Ramsey," set out four criteria
to be considered when applying either statutory standard:n
(a) the type of offense, including whether it demonstrated viciousness,
or involved force or violence; and (b) whether the offense is part of a
repetitive pattern of offenses- which indicates that the child may be
beyond rehabilitation under the regular statutory juvenile procedures;
and (c) the record of the child; and (d) the relative suitability of programs and facilities available to the juvenile and criminal courts.
Hennepin County and Ramsey County have their own juvenile court
rules which do not set out any criteria to be considered when applying
the statutory reference standard in the respective counties. Thus, the
way the law currently stands, all Minnesota juvenile courts should consider the six criteria set out in Hogan when applying the "public safety"
standard and juvenile courts outside Hennepin County and Ramsey
County should consider the four criteria set out in the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules when applying both statutory standards. Or, put another way, the juvenile courts in Hennepin County and Ramsey County,
where over fifty percent' of the juvenile hearings in Minnesota occur,
have no specific criteria to consider when they determine if a juvenile
is suitable for treatment.
The Minnesota Legislature should remedy this situation by establishing criteria which must be considered by all Minnesota juvenile courts
when considering the questions of "public safety" and "suitable to treatment." The criteria set out in Hogan,3 the Minesota Juvenile Court
Rules,N and the reference statutes of other states 3 could be a good
$1. The Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules were promulgated by the Minnesota Juvenile
Judges Association and became effective in all Minnesota probate-juvenile courts on
March 1, 1969. The rules are in effect in all counties where the probate court is the juvenile
court. See MINN. Juv. CT. R. 1-2(d) (1978). This includes all the Minnesota counties
except Hennepin and Ramsey. In Hennepin County and Ramsey County the district court
is the juvenile court. Act of Apr. 15, 1978, ch. 570, § 7, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 822
(West) (to be codified at MIN. STAT. § 260.019(1)). Hennepin County and Ramsey County
have their own juvenile court procedural rules.
32. See note 31 supra.
33. Mis. Juv. CT. R. 8-7(2)(a) to (d) (1978). See also Note, Reference for Prosecution
in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 54 MINN. L. Rav. 389, 402-07 (1969).
34. Note, Basic Rights for Juveniles in Juvenile Proceedings Under the Minnesota
Juvenile Court Rules: A Response to Gault, 54 MINN. L. Rzv. 335, 338 n.27 (1969).
35. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
36. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
37. For example the Colorado reference statute, COLO. Rav. STAT. § 19-3-108(2)(b)
(1973), provides:
In considering whether or not to waive juvenile court jurisdiction over the
child, the juvenile court shall consider the following factors:
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starting point. Some discretion should be preserved so that a juvenile
court judge can act as the representative of the state in a parens patriae
capacity and give each juvenile individual attention. An overriding purpose of the juvenile court is to determine the needs of the child and
society,38 not to adjudicate criminal conduct. Sufficient discretion
should be maintained to allow fulfillment of this purpose. Thus, the
standards should be sufficiently defined to eliminate unnecessary discretion which could be abused, while allowing sufficient discretion for
the juvenile court to function in its parens patriae role. Well-defined
standards would also make it easier for a reviewing court to determine
if there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Without much analysis, the court answered the second due process
argument-that the reference statute is arbitrarily and capriciously
applied-by listing four constitutionally required procedural safeguards
for waiver hearings and implying that the Minnesota procedure meets
the four requirements.39 While the court was correct in holding that the
Minnesota reference procedure does meet due process requirements,
additional discussion beyond that given by the court probably would
have been beneficial.
The four procedural safeguards set out by the Minnesota Supreme
Court as being required at all waiver proceedings were:' 0
(1) If the juvenile court is considering a waiver of jurisdiction, the
juvenile is entitled to a hearing;
(2) The juvenile is entitled to representation by counsel at such
hearing;
(3) The juvenile's attorney must be given access to the juvenile's
social record on request; and
(4) If jurisdiction is waived, the juvenile is entitled to a statement
of reasons in support of the waiver order.
The reference procedure used in Minnesota meets all four of these re(1) The seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires isolation of the child beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;
(11) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner;
(I) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons;
(IV) The maturity of the child as determined by considerations of his home,
environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;
(V) The record and previous history of the child; and
(VI) The likelihood of rehabilitation of the child by use of facilities available
to the juvenile court.
38. See notes 5, 7 supra.
39. See Minn. at _
244 N.W.2d at 36. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not
specifically state that the four procedural safeguards were met by the Minnesota reference
procedure. The court implied that there was evidence that the safeguards were satisfied.
See id.
40. Id.
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quirements. The first three-a hearing, right to counsel, and access to
social records-are required by the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act,"' the
Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules, 2 the Hennepin County Juvenile Court
Rules, 3 and the Ramsey County Juvenile Court Rules." The fourth
requirement-a statement of reasons if jurisdiction is waived-is not
specifically required by the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act or the Hennepin County Juvenile Court Rules but is required by the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules 5 and the Ramsey County Juvenile Court Rules."
The necessity of a statement of reasons and findings-of-fact was discussed at length by the supreme court in LQ.S.4' The court held that
juvenile court orders denying or granting reference must be accompanied by an adequate statement of the facts considered and the reasons
for the decision. 8 These findings-of-fact need not be formal but must
41. MINN. STAT. ch. 260 (1976 & Suljp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
602, § 3-12, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 334 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978,
ch. 637, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 374 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
657, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 397 (West), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 750,
§§ 7, 9, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 822 (West), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch.
778, § 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 970 (West). A hearing must be held before a reference
decision can be made. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(c) (1976). The juvenile has a right to
counsel at the reference hearing. See id. § 260.155(2). The juvenile has a right to inspect
the records concerning him, see id. § 260.161(1), and this right should give the juvenile's
attorney a right to inspect any social reports on the juvenile.
42. Under the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules a reference hearing is required, see
MINN. Juv. CT. R. 8-1(3) (1978), the juvenile has a right to legal counsel at the hearing,
see id. 2-1, and the juvenile's counsel has a right to inspect any report on file with the
court, see id. 8-3, 10-5, which would include social reports on the juvenile.
43. The Hennepin County Juvenile Court Rules have been adopted by the Hennepin
County District Court, Juvenile Division. Under these rules a juvenile has a right to
counsel at the reference hearing. See HENN. COUNTY, MINN., Juv. CT. R. 6.2 (Aug. 1977).
While not specifically granting the rights, the rules imply that a juvenile has a right to a
reference hearing, see id. 4, and a right to have his counsel inspect social reports on the
juvenile, see id. 5.1.
44. The Ramsey County Juvenile Court Rules have been adopted by the Ramsey
County District Court, Juvenile Division. These rules give a juvenile the right to a reference hearing, see RAmEY COUNTY, MINN., Juv. CT. R. 5.01 (June 1, 1971), the right to
counsel at the hearing, see id. 2.03, 5.01, and the right to have his counsel inspect social
reports on the juvenile, see id. 5.10.
45. If a court covered by the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules decides to refer a juvenile
for prosecution as an adult, the court must make separate findings-of-fact which include
the court's reasons for referring and the facts supporting its reasons. See MINN. Juv. CT.
R. 8-7(1)(b) (1978).
46. See RAmsEY COUNTY, MINN., JUV. CT. R. 5.01 (June 1, 1971) which requires that the
court "announce the facts ...
which it considers to have been clearly and convincingly
proven." This should be interpreted to include a statement of the reasons for a decision
to refer. While the Hennepin County Juvenile Court Rules currently in effect, HENN.
COUNTY, MINN., JUV. CT. R. (Aug. 1977), do not specifically require findings-of-fact, the
prior version did. See HENN. COUNTY, MINN., JUV. CT. R. 5.23 (Nov. 1974). Thus, prior to
the decision in I. Q.S., which now requires findings-of-fact in all reference decisions,
Hennepin County specifically required findings-of-fact.
47. See Minn. at __,
244 N.W.2d at 37-39.
48. Id. at -,
244 N.W.2d at 38. These "findings-of-fact" are necessitated by the
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/8
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show that the court has fully investigated the matter, demonstrate that
the court's decision was based on careful consideration of the facts, and
indicate which of the two statutory standards the court applied.' The
court indicated that such findings will help assure procedural regularity,
which is especially important because of the substantial discretion
that juvenile court judges have in making the reference decision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently arrived at the four procedural safeguards set out in . Q. S. by reading together the United States
Supreme Court decisions of Kent v. United StatesN and In re Gault" as
constitutionally requiring them. Kent was not a decision of constitutional dimensions; rather, it involved the interpretation of the District
of Columbia Juvenile Court Act. The Court interpreted the Act to require that a juvenile be given four procedural safeguards during the
waiver proceedings: a hearing,"2 assistance of counsel,"5 access to social
records on the juvenile,5' and a statement of reasons for the court's
decision.55 These four safeguards are the same as those set out in I. Q.S."6
While the procedural safeguards set out for the waiver process by
Kent were based on statutory construction and not constitutional requirements, some courts, 57 including the Minnesota Supreme Court in
I. Q. S.,8 have interpreted the safeguards as having been raised to constitutional dimensions by the decision in Gault.5' Although it can be
complexity of reviewing juvenile court orders. See id. In a case subsequent to I. Q.S., the
supreme court interpreted their pronouncement in L Q.S. to mean that detailed findings
should be employed so that the reviewing court could determine the precise basis for the
reference decision. Full compliance was urged. See In re Welfare of K.T.N., Minn.
-,

,251

N.W.2d 636, 638 (1977).

49. - Minn. at , 244 N.W.2d at 38. This assumes that the motion for reference
was granted. However, the statutory standards may still need to be discussed even if
reference is denied. For example, the court remanded the three appeals in I. Q.S. where
the juvenile court found the juveniles to be amenable to treatment but failed to discuss
its conclusion that each of the juveniles represented a danger to the public safety. See text
accompanying note 64 infra.
50. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
51. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. 383 U.S. at 561-62.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 562-63.
55. Id. at 561.
56. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
57. See, e.g., In re Harris, 67 Cal. 2d 876, 879, 434 P.2d 615, 617, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319, 321
(1967) (in bank). For a criticism of the Harris decision, see Note, supra note 4, at 320.
58. See

-

Minn. at

-

, 244 N.W.2d at 36.

59. Gault involved an adjudicatory hearing, not a waiver or reference hearing as was
involved in Kent. The United States Supreme Court held in Gault that certain procedural
safeguards are constitutionally required in a juvenile adjudicatory hearing which may
result in placing a juvenile in an institution. The safeguards required were: notice of the
charges, 387 U.S. at 31-34; right to counsel, id. at 34-42; right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, id. at 56-57; and the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 44-55.
Some of the language in Gault has been interpreted as indicating that the procedural
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argued that this interpretation is not strictly correct,"0 it does not affect
the court's reasoning in I. Q. S. since there can be little doubt that the
United States Supreme Court would constitutionally require the same
four safeguards for all waiver or transfer proceedings if specifically faced
with the question. In fact, it is likely that the United States Supreme
Court would constitutionally require that waiver proceedings include
the three additional procedural safeguards constitutionally required by
Gault for the juvenile adjudicatory hearing:' notice of the hearing, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against
2
The Minnesota procedure does require these three
self-incrimination.
3
safeguards.
After discussing the standards and findings-of-fact requirements, the
Minnesota Supreme Court applied them to the nine appeals. Three
cases-I. Q. S., E. T. B., and T. L.P. -where reference was denied and the
safeguards set out in Kent, see notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text, are constitutionally required for waiver hearings, see notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
60. The United States Supreme Court specifically stated in Gault that it was not
considering the applicability of procedural safeguards to other parts of the juvenile process, which would include reference proceedings. At one point the Court stated:
We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile "deliquents." For
example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights
applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our
attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process. . . .We consider
only the problems presented to us by this case.
387 U.S. at 13. At another point the Court stated that "[the problems of preadjudication treatment of juveniles, and of post-adjudication disposition, are unique to
the juvenile process; hence what we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural
requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other steps of the
juvenile process." Id. at 31 n.48. Thus, a strict interpretation of Gault would not raise the
procedural requirements of Kent, which applied only to the reference process, to constitutional dimensions.
61. A decision at the reference hearing to prosecute criminally a juvenile as an adult
would have potentially far more adverse consequences for a juvenile than an adjudication
of juvenile deliquency. Thus, it seems logical that a juvenile should be accorded all the
procedural safeguards which are constitutionally required of a hearing on the question of
juvenile deliquency at a hearing on the reference question. Of course, once a juvenile is
referred for prosecution as an adult he will have all of the procedural safeguards of any
accused criminal. However, these safeguards do not help him during the stage when the
most important decision may have been made-the reference hearing.
62. See note 59 supra.
63. A juvenile is entitled to notice of the reference hearing. See MINN. STAT. §
260.125(2)(b) (1976); MINN. JUV. CT. R. 8-2 (1978). A juvenile also has the right of crossexamination. See MINN. STAT. § 260.155(6) (1976); MINN. Juv. CT. R. 2-3(1)(b) to (c)
(1978). While the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act does not specifically state that a juvenile
has the right against self-incrimination during a reference proceeding, there are no Minnesota cases which deny the right and the Minnesota cases which have considered the right
of a juvenile to remain silent in other contexts appear to assume that the right exists. See,
e.g., State v. O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60, 70-71, 216 N.W.2d 822, 829 (1974); State v. Hogan,
297 Minn. 430, 440-41, 212 N.W.2d 664, 670-71 (1973). The Minnesota Juvenile Court
Rules, as distinguished from the Act, specifically give a juvenile the right to remain silent.
See MINN. JUV. CT. R. 2-2 (1978).
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state appealed, were remanded for further consideration by the juvenile
court. The Juvenile Division of the Hennepin County District Court had
found the juveniles to be amenable to treatment and had based its
decisions not to refer on these findings. However, the juvenile court had
also found that each of the juveniles was dangerous, a finding which
would support reference. The supreme court remanded the cases for the
juvenile court to consider the risk the juveniles presented to the public
safety."4 The supreme court apparently felt that the findings-of-fact
were insufficient to explain the apparent anomoly in the juvenile court's
decisions.
Referral orders were affirmed in the J. E. C., Hunter, Romanowski,
Amos, Wright, and Parker cases. In Hunter and Romanowski the Minnesota Supreme Court found the juvenile court's findings insufficient to
support a referral decision but went on to find adequate evidence in the
juvenile court's records to affirm the referrals. 5 In the other four cases
the court found sufficient findings to support the decisions to refer.
Finally, Minnesota's failure to provide separate facilities for hardcore
juveniles, which was originally discussed by the supreme court in the
case of In re Welfare of J.E.C., 6 was again noted by the court in I. Q.S.
This failure is probably the primary reason for most reference orders. As
the supreme court stated in . Q. S., facility considerations "continue to
be paramount in this court's resolution of the propriety of orders of the
64.

-

Minn. at

-,

244 N.W.2d at 39.

65. See id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 40-41. In Hunter the juvenile court apparently found
that the juvenile was not amenable to treatment because of a lack of adequate treatment
facilities. See id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 40. The supreme court indicated that, based on
its prior decision of In re Welfare of J.E.C., 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975), such
a lack of facilities is not itself sufficient to support a decision that a juvenile is not
amenable to treatment. However, the supreme court found from the record that the
juvenile in this case had rejected prior attempts to treat him within the juvenile system
Minn. at
and thus should be prosecuted as an adult for reasons of public safety. See -,

244 N.W.2d at 40.

In Romanowski the juvenile court had found that:
1. Respondent is chronically anti-social, hedonistically concerned with immediate gratification of his wants, by lawful means if possible, otherwise by unlawful means. He is without conscience. He has no need for other persons and
resents any intrusion into his life style.
2. He is unamenable to any known means of socializing therapy.
3. The prognosis is unacceptably poor for modifying his behavior by a program
of security with gradually acquired accountability, or by any other existing or
feasible program within the Juvenile Justice System before his twenty-first
birthday.
Id. The supreme court indicated that these findings might not be sufficient to support
a decision to refer. The supreme court went on to find, however, that the trial court's
record indicated that the juvenile had previously been before the juvenile court on several
occasions and that he had failed to respond to treatment. These findings were sufficient
to support the juvenile court's reference decision. See id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 40-41.
66. 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975). For a general discussion of the lack of
separate facilities for hardcore juvenile offenders in Minnesota, see Note, supra note 6.
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juvenile court either granting or denying motions for reference." ' 7 The
opinion of the supreme court and the special concurring opinion of Justice MacLaughlin 5 discuss this problem and correctly urge the Minnesota Legislature to consider seriously the problem of the lack of separate
facilities for hardcore juvenile offenders.
In conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court in I. Q. S. held that the
denial of a reference motion is appealable by the state, the Minnesota
reference statute and procedure are constitutional, and findings-of-fact
will be required of Minnesota juvenile courts in the future to facilitate
judicial review. While the Minnesota reference statute is constitutional,
the Minnesota Legislature should add specific criteria to be considered
by juvenile courts when applying the two standards set out in the reference statute. Additional criteria would supplement the findings-of-fact
requirements of L Q. S. and could be designed to help eliminate unnecessary judicial discretion, while leaving sufficient discretion to allow the
juvenile courts to function in their parens patriaerole. In addition, the
legislature should consider the need for a separate secure facility for
hardcore juvenile offenders.
Liquor Licensing-SuPREME COURT REVERSAL OF A MUNICIPALrrY's DEMinn. -,
246
NIAL OF A LimsE-Wajda v. City of Minneapolis,N.W.2d 455 (1976).
In Wajda v. City of Minneapolis,' the Minnesota Supreme Court
made an unprecedented decision to reverse a municipality's denial of a
liquor license. The appellant had operated or leased a 3.2 beer tavern
from 1954 until 1970 without violations of the law or neighborhood problems. Subsequently, the appellant leased the premises, first to her son
and later to an unrelated tenant. Each of these tenants obtained a
license to operate the tavern, as required by city ordinance.' During
67.

-

Minn. at _

244 N.W.2d at 39.

68. Justice MacLaughlin, concurring specially in I.Q.S., elaborated on the difficult
questions of fact and policy involved in providing a separate facility for hardcore juvenile
offenders. On one side is the belief that some hardcore juvenile offenders can be rehabilitated, consistent with the purposes and directions of the Juvenile Court Act, if a separate
facility is provided. Such a facility would avoid placing juveniles in an adult detention
facility which, it is generally agreed, decreases the chance of rehabilitation. On the other
side is the Department of Corrections' conclusion that it is not feasible to develop a
separate secure facility for hardcore juvenile offenders. See id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 4143. See generally Boxmeyer, supra note 6.
1.

-

Minn.

-,

246 N.W.2d 455 (1976).

2. MINNEAPous, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCaS § 366.10 (1976) requires that every seller
of beer be licensed. A license may be transferred, but the application procedures for
transfers, renewals, and new licenses are essentially the same. See id. § 366.110. Applications are investigated by the police license inspector. See id. § 366.150. Hearings on
applications are then held by a committee of the city council. See id. §§ 366.180, .200.
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